Suggestion of a theoretical framework to analyze auditor's apparent independence by Doñate Maset, Paula
 
 
 
Suggestion of a 
theoretical framework to 
analyze  auditor’s 
apparent independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paula Doñate Maset 
 al258228@uji.es 
 Finance and Accounting 
 Academic course: 2017-2018 
 Tutor: Alejandro José Barrachina Monfort 
  JEL Classification: C72; D80; M42. 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we suggest a theoretical framework to theoretically analyze auditor’s 
apparent independence as perceived by external users of financial and audit reports of 
a certain company.  The framework suggested is based on a game-theoretical model of 
imperfect information in which an auditor has to decide whether or not to keep his 
independence when issuing a report about the financial situation of a company he is 
auditing. Once the company’s audit report is published, it is checked by an external 
user in order to decide whether or not to establish a financial relation with the company 
without knowing the decision taken by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor’s context 
generates a signal about his independence which is correct with certain probability and 
helps the external user to better decide whether or not to trust the audit report. 
 
Keywords: Theoretical framework; Auditor’s independence; Signals; Financial reports; 
Trust. 
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SUGGESTION OF A THEORICAL FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE AUDITOR'S 
APPARENT INDEPENDENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there have been certain accounting scandals such as the Enron case, 
the biggest American financial. In Spain it can be taken as a reference the cases of 
Bankia and Pescanova which stand out for having submitted clear accounts and 
favorable audit reports, subsequently large amounts of debt and hidden accounting 
were revealed. These cases have reduced the confidence in the audit and even 
mading it responsible for not reveal cases of corruption. 
Thus, the first clarification that should be made is about the audit work, which is not 
intended to reveal corruption cases, but is responsible for checking the accuracy of the 
financial statements with respect to accounting principles and representation of the 
faithful appearance of the entity. Once it was said, the auditor must write a report in 
which he expresses his agreement or not about the financial statements of the audited 
entity. 
When an auditor is going to perform his duties in a company he can adopt two possible 
positions. The first one is to be independent, according to the definition of the RAE, 
said of a person: That sustains their rights or opinions without admitting outside 
intervention. To this definition we can add what was mentioned by E. Rubio (2016) 
auditors should refrain from acting when their objectivity could be compromised, so an 
auditor will be independent when he is objective in the performance of his audit tasks. 
The second position would be not to be independent, although it is not as it is assumed 
that an audit professional should act. 
It is clear that from external point of view, a user of the accounting information does not 
have the certainty to know the position actually adopted by the auditor, which resides 
solely in his mind. This type of independence is known as real independence. 
However, a user can form an idea or opinion regarding the position actually adopted by 
the auditor based on the surroundings. This independence that can be perceived 
through the surroundings is called apparent independence. 
It can be taken some real references in relation to the users of the accounting or audit 
information, for example, a banking entity to which a large company has requested the 
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granting of a loan or an investor that decides to invest in a company. To make this type 
of decision in a reasonable way it is recommendable to know the annual accounts of 
the company and audit opinions, especially to get an idea about the prospects for 
benefits and growth of it. As a result it is very important that an auditor gives his opinion 
in an objective way.  
In addition, it would be important to emphasize the value of apparent independence. 
The relationships that an auditor can establish in their surrounding are taken by 
external users as signs of their level of independence. Whether users perceive that the 
auditor's surrounding does not favor objectivity, they will not trust on the auditor's work 
even if they have maintained an independent position. For this reason, apparent 
independence is so important, because external signals will have more weight than the 
real independence of the auditor to determinate the credibility of his work. 
Once the importance of apparent independence is clear, must be commented the 
different situations and surroundings that can affect the auditor, that is, how the 
auditor's independence is perceived by external users. A. Vico and Mª C. Pucheta 
(2004) make a review of different research works that have empirically studied how 
different situations in auditor’s surrounding affect the apparent independence. Among 
these situations are the following. 
A common situation is the audit firm provides additional services to the audited entity, 
there is a negative relationship between the provision of additional services and the 
independence perceived by the user, because in this situation the auditor could be 
more committed to the entity and benefit from issuing a favorable report for its hiring in 
other services. 
Regarding the relationship between auditor and client. Firstly, the fact that the auditing 
firm is part of a joint venture of which the audited company is also part, reduces the 
auditor's independence perceived by the public. Secondly, the fact that a high 
percentage of the auditor's total income depends on the same audited company is 
perceived as lack of independence. 
Other studies take into account that an auditor belongs to a corporation, that is, they 
have favorably rated the impact of compulsory professional affiliation on a corporation 
of auditors as a measure to safeguard independence. Both, the auditor and the user, 
rely on the ethical and moral codes of conduct of the professional organizations, these 
are requirements that will ensure that the independence is maintained. 
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Regarding the level of competition in the market for audit services, several studies 
show that the more competitive the market is, there are more risks of non-
independence of the auditor perceived by external users. It can affect the size of the 
audited company, since it has been observed that the greater this is, the users 
perceive more risk of non-independence. 
In this paper we attempt to take a modest step forward and suggest a theoretical 
setting to address this research question. It elaborates on previous theoretical work 
about espionage (for instance, Solan and Yariv, 2004, and Jelnov et al. 2017) to 
assume that external users can observe signals about auditor independence which 
they consider correct with certain probability. While the espionage models assume that 
some agent has access to an Intelligence System (IS) of a certain precision which 
sends signals to its owner about some aspect of the rival, in the present framework we 
assume that the signal is sent by the auditor’s context. The situations favorable to 
auditor’s apparent independence would imply that the independence signal is correct 
with a relatively high probability. The next section summarizes the contribution of the 
paper in detail.  
 
OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
The framework we suggest in the present paper analyzes the effects of the signals of 
an auditor’s apparent independence over the interaction between this auditor and a 
user of the audit information. More precisely, the framework suggested is based on a 
game-theoretical model of imperfect information (as the theoretical models about 
espionage of Solan and Yariv, 2004, and Jelnov et al. 2017). The basic model 
considers an interesting situation at which an auditor’s independence may be 
compromised. In particular, it considers the case of an auditor that finds out that the 
accounting reports of the firm he is auditing is not reflecting, in his opinion, its actual 
financial and economic situation. In such a situation, the auditor has to decide whether 
to keep his independence and issue a report with qualifications, or give in to firm’s 
indications and issue a favorable one.     
Once the firm’s audit report is published, it is checked by an external user in order to 
decide whether to establish a financial relation with the firm. Once the user has 
checked the firm’s financial information and the audit report, she has to decide whether 
or not to trust the audit report without knowing if the auditor has issued it keeping his 
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independence or giving in to the firm’s indications. Note that trusting a favorable report 
would mean that the user would be willing to establish financial relations with the firm, 
while not trusting a favorable report or trusting a report with qualifications would mean 
not to establish such a relation.     
In such a setting, it is reasonable to assume that the least preferred scenario for the 
user is not to trust the audit report when the auditor kept his independence. Actually, 
trusting the report when the auditor was independent is the best scenario for the user, 
even better than not trusting it when the auditor gave in to firm’s indications. Finally, it 
would be obvious that the user would prefer that scenario to trusting the report when 
the auditor was not independent. 
We consider three possible cases for the auditor. The first one would be the case of an 
auditor that always prefers to keep his independence. This would be the case, on the 
one hand, of a very ethical auditor who prefers not to betray his independence no 
matter the rewards offered by the audited company. On the other hand, this case could 
represent a situation where the auditor is not that ethical but the audited company does 
not offer any reward to the auditor for following its instructions, or the reward offered is 
very small.  
The second one would be the case of an auditor that always prefers to give in to firm’s 
indications. This case would represent a situation where an auditor with a usual ethical 
level (not as high as the discussed before) is auditing a company which offers him very 
attractive rewards for following its instructions and betraying his independence (one 
could think in a small auditing firm with few clients). Another situation represented by 
this case would be when a possible investigation of auditor’s non-independence would 
imply a small cost for him. 
The last case we consider for the basic model is that where the auditor only prefers to 
keep his independence if he knew that the user were not going not to trust his report. 
This would be the case of an auditor with a usual ethical level but really attracted by the 
rewards offered by the audited company if he betrays his independence. Nevertheless, 
if the user does not trust his report when he has not been independent, an investigation 
about his independence level could be too costly for him.  
In this last case, the auditor is going to choose one of his two strategies with some 
positive probability, but it is not known what he is going to choose finally. It is in this 
case where makes sense to consider that the external user takes into account different 
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aspects of the auditor’s context to infer the level of auditor’s independence. The 
auditor’s context sends some signals about his level of independence to the user.  
To include this aspect in the model, we consider that the auditor’s context sends out 
one of two signals. The signal I indicates that the auditor has kept his independence, 
and the signal ni indicates the opposite. The signal received by the external user is 
correct with certain exogenous probability, which is assumed (without loss of 
generality) to be in between 
1
2
 and 1 and it is commonly known by both the user and 
the auditor. Note that the case where this probability is equal to 
1
2
 is the case where 
the signal received is not informative and it would be the basic model considered 
above. The case where the probability is equal to 1 is the case where the signal is 
completely true and the user knows what the auditor has decided. 
In this extension of the basic model, when the auditor decides whether or not to keep 
his independence when auditing the firm, the user observes a signal about auditor’s 
independence which she knows is correct with certain probability. The user does not 
observe the actual decision of the auditor but when she checks the audit report the 
signal received helps her to better decide whether or not to trust it. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In a game several individuals interact, after established rules, to make certain decisions 
which they will find a result. Game Theory is a branch of mathematics that studies the 
rational behavior of players trying to maximize their profits or utilities. These players 
interact with others so that they do not know the costs and benefits that each strategy 
could offer them, they are not fixed in advance, because they also depend on the 
decisions of other players. 
In practice it can be applied to various situations in which two or more people have to 
decide which strategies and decisions take, in which they will be affected mutually. 
Players will choose these strategies and decisions based on the satisfaction of their 
goals. 
These games may have certain specific characteristics, such as zero-sum games or 
non-zero games, that is, in a zero-sum game, what one wins is lost by the other player 
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completely. In a non-zero game, this does not happen. In cooperative games, players 
could maximize their benefits whether they agree and choose the best result that 
reports higher payoffs to both, however, in the non-cooperative you look for your own 
benefit. 
Regarding the moment when players make their decisions, games can differentiate 
between sequential and simultaneous. In simultaneous games the players choose their 
strategy at the same time. In the sequential games, first choose a player and then the 
rest, in this case the rest of the players can know the decision made by the first. 
In addition we can distinguish between games of perfect information and games of 
imperfect information. In the games of perfect information some players know the 
decisions of the rest, before choosing their strategy, however, in the imperfect 
information games the players decide without knowing the strategy that the other 
players have chosen. As we can deduce the games of simultaneous decision will 
always be of imperfect information, because all players decide their strategy at the 
same time, it is impossible for anyone to know the choice of other players. In contrast, 
sequential decision games can be both, perfect information and imperfect information. 
There are two ways of representing a game, in extensive and normal form. Focusing 
on a two-player game with two strategies each, it would be represented in an extensive 
form as follows: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An advantage of representing the game in this form is that it is clear what the order of 
the game is. The tree clearly shows that player 1 moves first and player 2 watches this 
movement, but not in this case because the dotted line that joins the decision nodes of 
1 
2 2 
L 
L 
R 
L 
U 
L 
U 
L 
D 
L 
D 
  (1,0)                (2,3)   (0,0)               (3,1)               
Figure 1. Model players 1 and 2 (Extensive form) 
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player 2 is called information set, tells us that player 2 does not observe the choice of 
player 1, since this example is a game with imperfect information 
The game begins when player 1 decides between strategy L or R, then player 2 will 
have to decide between strategies U and D according to which report greater benefit or 
utility, but without knowing the decision of player 1. At the end of the whole game the 
paoffs are represented after each decision of the players. 
This game can also be represented in the normal form as follows: 
122222 U D 
L 1, 0 2, 3 
R 0, 0 3, 1 
 
Figure 2. Model players 1 and 2 (Normal form) 
     
The following figure represents the last example in extensive form but considering the 
perfect information case: 
 
Figure 3. Model players 1 and 2 (Extensive form-perfect information) 
 
Each game has a series of essential elements, focusing on our case we are going to 
talk about two or more players, the strategies, the payments and the results or the 
equilibrium. 
 
  (1,0)                (2,3)   (0,0)               (3,1)               
1 
2 2 
L 
L 
R 
L 
U 
L 
U 
L 
D 
L 
D 
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First of all, the players, every game needs two or more players. Each player sets a 
goal, because that they will try to maximize their profits or their utilities through the 
future decision of strategies. The simplest is the comparison with the game previously 
considered, where player 1 is designated with the number 1 and player 2 is designated 
with the number 2, could be called in any other way, for example with letters. 
Secondly, the decisions that each player can make are called strategies. There can not 
be a player with only a strategy, he should have a choice. In our case for player 1 there 
are strategies L and R and for player 2 there are strategies U and D. 
Thirdly, the payoffs of each player in each possible scenario of the game define their 
preferences on each strategy and scenario. They are pre-set amounts that, either in 
numerical terms or variables, will report the benefit that the player receives by selecting 
a specific strategy, that is, there is a payoff per strategy and player. For example, since 
player 1 has chosen L, player 2 can choose U and the payoff that results from having 
chosen this strategy will be (1, 0).  
The payoffs are represented by two numbers, for example (1, 0), the first is for the 
player 1 and the second is for the player 2. You can compare between the payoffs of 
the same strategy for a player to know which would bring you greater benefits, that is, 
whether we compare the payoff of player 2 when player 1 chooses L, he will prefer 3 to 
0 (3>0), so his best response, in this case, will be D. 
Once considered these essential elements of a game, another distinction between 
games can be introduced. This is the distinction between games of complete 
information and games of incomplete information. To explain this distinction we have to 
define first a central concept of Game Theory. This is the concept of common 
knowledge. Something is common knowledge among the players of a game if it is 
known by all the players, all the players know that it is known by all the players and so 
on. Therefore, a game of complete information is defined as a game in which all its 
elements (its rules, the number of players, and their strategies and payoffs) are 
common knowledge. If one or more elements of the game are not common knowledge 
among all the players, the game is of incomplete information. 
Finally, the results or equilibrium of the game. The solution or equilibrium of a game 
can be both pure strategies and mixed strategies. A solution in pure strategies implies 
that the players choose one of their strategies with probability 1, that is, this will be the 
strategy they choose. In contrast, a solution in mixed strategies means that players 
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assign probabilities less than 1 to several of their strategies, so that the probability of 
choosing one strategy over another may be greater, that is, there will be a greater 
probability of choosing a strategy. 
A first concept to take into account to solve a game is the dominant strategy. This 
dominant strategy would occur when a player only opts for a strategy as the best 
response, that is, in the case of the player 1 it would be the same as the strategy 
chosen by the player 2 since, given the payoffs, strategy L will always bring a greater 
benefit to the player 1. A strictly dominant strategy is the strategy that always provides 
a greater utility to a player, regardless of the strategy of the other player.  
We can take the case of Figure 2 as an example, this can be seen in the following way, 
if player 1 decided to choose L player 2 would prefer the payoff of 3 before 0 (3> 0), 
that is, strategy D, if player 1 decided to choose R player 2 would prefer the payoff of 1 
before 0 (1> 0), that is, he would also choose the strategy D. This strategy D will be the 
dominant one for player 2. In the same way we can observe how Player 1 has no 
dominant strategy, since if player 2 decided to choose U player 1 would prefer the 
payoff of 1 before 0 (1> 0), that is, strategy L, if player 2 decided to choose D player 1 
would prefer the payoff of 3 before 2 (3>2), that is, strategy R. 
However, there are games in which no player has any dominant strategy. In these 
cases the result is obtained by applying the notion of Nash equilibrium. It must be kept 
in mind that any dominant strategy equilibrium is always a Nash equilibrium. However, 
not all Nash equilibrium are balances of dominant strategies. 
A scenario of the game is a Nash equilibrium when each of the players is choosing 
their best strategy given the strategies that other players are choosing. 
That is, in a Nash equilibrium each player is choosing his best response given the 
strategies that other players are choosing. An equivalent definition would be that in a 
Nash equilibrium none of the players has incentives to deviate given the strategies that 
other players are choosing. 
We can conclude that a game represents a strategic interaction between players, in the 
sense that the payoff that each player will receive at the end not only depends on the 
strategy chosen by this player but also on the strategies chosen by the other players. 
Being an example of a game in which there is two equilibrium in pure strategies the 
following: 
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1          2 U D 
L 1, 0 0, -1 
R 0, 0 1, 1 
 
Figure 4. Model players 1 and 2 (Normal form-pure strategies) 
 
This game will be interpreted in the following way, if the player 2 knew that the player 1 
has chosen L, he would prefer the strategy U (0> -1). In the same way if the player 1 
knew that the player 2 has chosen U, he would prefer the strategy L (1> 0). In this 
scenario of the game both players are choosing their best strategy given the strategy of 
the other player, it is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
On the other hand, if the player 2 knew that the player 1 has chosen R, he would prefer 
D (1> 0). And, if the player 1 knew that the player 2 has chosen D, he would prefer R 
(1> 0). We have managed to find another solution. 
In conclusion, we can find two solutions in pure strategies in this model, without the 
need for any player to have a dominant strategy.  
In contrast, there are games in which there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, 
since there is no game scenario in which both players choose a pure strategy and none 
of them has no incentive to deviate to another pure strategy, given what the other 
player does. That is, in all possible scenarios of the game in which both players choose 
a pure strategy, some of the players have incentives to deviate to another pure 
strategy, given what the other player is doing, then the equilibrium of the game will be 
in mixed strategies. 
A game with a mixed strategy equilibrium could be the following: 
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1         2 U D 
L 1*, 0 1, 1* 
R 0, 1* 2*, 0 
 
Figure 5. Model players 1 and 2 (Normal form-mixed strategy equilibrium) 
 
Let x  be the probability player 1 assigns to strategy L (and, therefore, 1 x  the 
probability assigned to strategy R), and let y  be the probability player 2 assigns to 
strategy U (and, therefore, 1 y  the probability assigned to strategy R). According to 
the indifference principle, if there exists some mixed strategy equilibrium in this game, 
player 1, for instance, must be indifferent between his two pure strategies (L and R) 
given the probabilities assigned by player 2 to his strategies U and D. Namely, player 
1’s expected utility of choosing L (  1UE L ) given the probabilities  ,1y y  assigned 
by player 2 to his strategies, 
    1 1 1 1 1UE y yL      
must be equal to his expected utility of choosing R (  1UE R ), 
     1 0 2 1 2 1UE y yR y      
Therefore, 
   1 1 RE LU UE  
 1 2 1 y   
which implies that 
1
2
y  . Similarly, player 2 must be indifferent between his two pure 
strategies (U and D) given the probabilities assigned by player 1 to his strategies L and 
R. Namely, player 2’s expected utility of choosing U (  2UE U ) given the probabilities 
 ,1x x  assigned by player 1 to his strategies, 
    2 0 1 1 1UE x xU x      
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must be equal to his expected utility of choosing D (  2UE D ), 
   2 1 0 1UE x x xD      
Therefore, 
   2 2 DE UU UE  
1x x   
which implies that 
1
2
x  .  
Hence, the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies in this game is that player 1 assigns 
probabilities 
1
2
x   and 
1
1
2
x   to his strategies L and R, respectively; and player 2 
assigns probabilities  
1
2
y 
 
and 
1
1
2
y   to his strategies U and D, respectively. 
Note that player 1’s expected payoff in this equilibrium is 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
   
            
   
 
and player 1 has no incentive to deviate because deviating to one pure strategy he 
would obtain the same expected payoff given the probabilities assigned by player 2 to 
his strategies. Similarly, player 2’s expected payoff in this equilibrium is   
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2
   
            
   
 
and he has no incentive to deviate because deviating to one pure strategy he would 
obtain the same expected payoff given the probabilities assigned by player 1 to his 
strategies. 
Note that all these examples considered until now were games of imperfect 
information. To find the equilibrium of a game of perfect information is even easier. 
Consider, for instance, the following game: 
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It can appreciate that is the perfect information version of the game represented by 
Figure 5 above. It is easy to see that the best response of player 2 is D if he observes 
player 1 chooses L (since 1>0), and U if he observes player 1 chooses R (since 1>0 
again). Player 1, anticipating this reaction of player 2 (since she knows that player 2 will 
observe her choice before choosing his strategy and the game is of complete 
information, namely player 1 knows the payoffs of player 2 in each scenario of the 
game), is going to choose L since 1>0. Therefore, the unique equilibrium of this game 
of perfect information is the scenario where player 1 chooses L and Player 2 chooses 
D. And the process applied to obtain the equilibrium of this game (and of the games of 
perfect information in general) is called backward induction. 
In the next section of the paper, we develop a non-cooperative and non-zero sum 
game of complete information between the auditor of certain company and an external 
user of the company’s financial and audit reports. Hence, in this game there two 
players (the auditor and the external user) and each player has two strategies. The 
auditor’s strategies are to be or not to be independent when elaborating his reports 
about the financial situation of the company; and the user’s strategies are to trust or not 
to trust the audit report. This game is sequential, in the sense that the auditor chooses 
his strategy before the user, but the user chooses her strategy without knowing the 
auditor’s decision (namely, this game is of imperfect information). 
 
Figure 6. Model players 1 and 2 (Extensive form-perfect information 2) 
  (1,0)                (1,1)   (0,1)               (2,0)               
1 
2 2 
L 
L 
R 
L 
U 
L 
U 
L 
D 
L 
D 
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AUDITOR – USER MODEL 
We consider the case of an auditor that thinks the accounting reports of the company 
he is auditing does not completely reflect its actual economic and financial situation, 
and he is considering to submit a report with qualifications. Nevertheless, the firm 
suggests him to submit a favorable one. Hence, the auditor has to decide whether to 
keep his independence, or to yield to the company's suggestions to transmit that the 
accounting information reflects faithfully the situation of the same (ie, betray his 
independence and issue a favorable report). 
Once the audit report is published, it is consulted by an external user to decide whether 
to establish economic-financial relations with the company. Once the accounting 
information and the audit report have been consulted, the external user must decide 
whether trust or not on the auditor's report without knowing whether the auditor has 
issued it maintaining his independence or following the instructions of the company. 
Note that the report is not informative about the behavior of the auditor. The model is 
assuming, on the one hand, that if the auditor decides not to be independent, he issues 
a favorable report. But the user only checking a favorable report cannot infer if the 
auditor has been independent or not. On the other hand, if the auditor decides to be 
independent, he will issue a report with qualifications. However, once again, a user 
checking such a report cannot be sure that the auditor was independent. In fact, the 
user could think that there is a possibility that an independent auditor would issue a 
unfavorable report. 
However, this setting, in which the user makes a decision without knowing the strategy 
chosen by the auditor, would make little sense if it were assumed that being 
independent means to issue a unfavorable report. In such a case, the user checking a 
unfavorable report can be sure that the auditor decided to be independent. 
The above situation and the payoffs in each possible scenario are shown in extensive 
form by the figure below. For this representation, trees are used to graphically 
represent the strategic interaction between the players. These must include a set of 
players, in this case auditor and user, the order of events through nodes (represents 
the place where a player must make a decision) and branches (represents the 
decisions to choose for each player), the order of the movements of the players, the 
possible actions in each node, the set of available information and the payoffs each 
player receives by strategy. 
15 
 
 
Figure 7. Auditor-user game (Extensive form) 
 
The user's preferences regarding their strategies are based on the choice made by the 
auditor. Whether the user knew that the auditor has chosen to be independent, he 
would prefer to trust, since it is the strategy with the highest payoff 
( ( ) 1 ; ( ) )UEu T x UEu NT x   . It is logical to think that if the user knew that the auditor 
has been independent, he will rely on his reports, considering that, for example, he will 
have no doubt to rely on the audit reports to analyze the company and make his 
investment decisions. 
While if the user knew that the auditor has chosen not to be independent, he would 
prefer not to trust 
1
( 0)
2
 . Knowing that the auditor has not been independent 
regarding the company, the user will choose not to trust on the favorable report, 
because this report will not reflect the true image of the company, the reality of its 
accounts and the user could not form an opinion to the respect. In this case, the user 
could sue the auditor, he will get into trouble. 
As it has been shown, the user's payoffs are easy to quantify, however, the auditor's 
payoffs interfere with important variables that we will explain below. The parameter m 
includes the auditor's ethical satisfaction of being independent (it would take into 
account the auditor's moral). The parameter f is the satisfaction that the company 
reports to the auditor for not carrying out its work independently (that is, by showing a 
favorable report when it really does not reflect the reality of the company), which may 
come either from ensuring the continuity in the company, or from bribery or from drive 
out the pressure exerted by the company on the auditor. Finally, r represents the cost 
to the auditor of not having been independent when the user does not trust his report. 
 
A 
U U 
I 
L 
NI 
L 
T 
L 
T 
L 
NT 
L 
NT 
  (m,1)          (m,- 
1
 2
)   (f,0)             (f-r,- 
1
 2
)               
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In this case, the auditor deal with the possibility of the user reveal it  and opening an 
investigation that may discover that he has not work independently, with the 
consequent cost in terms of money and in terms of reputation. 
Note that if the auditor decides to maintain his independence and issues a report with 
qualifications about the accounting information of the company, it does not matter 
whether the user trust or not into this report (in both cases the auditor's payoff is equal 
to m) due to the non-confidence of a user in a report with qualifications, cannot have 
negative repercussions on the auditor even if it is in terms of reputation. We must also 
take into account that, for the external user, not trusting a report with qualifications is 
the situation with the least sense for him (it is the situation least preferred by the 
external user with a payoff equal to
1
2
 ). 
Taking these parameters into account, we can raise the auditor's preferences 
regarding each possible scenario. Let us consider three possible situations. The first 
one would be the case where the auditor prefers to be independent no matter the 
future decision of the user, namely m>f (and, therefore m>f-r). Therefore, there are two 
extreme possibilities for this case. While the first one would be that m is relatively large, 
in the second one there would be when a very small variable f. 
The first one (m is relatively large) would be the case of a very ethical auditor. Without 
taking into account the external circumstances of the surroundings, this auditor will 
always prefer to follow his ideals, in this case be independent before any circumstance 
that may arise. This auditor would not be affected by elements related to economic 
benefits or increase in the provision of its services following the company’s instructions 
and betraying his independence. On the other hand, he would be affected by his own 
ethics since he would have no incentive to deviate at all, so he would always issue a 
report with qualifications as he would be maintaining his independence.  
In the case of the existence of a very small variable f, the auditor does not need to be 
very ethical, since in such a situation the company will not reward him at all for 
deviating and issuing a favorable opinion report, or the reward is so small that it will be 
more satisfying for the auditor to maintain his independence in the face of the 
compensation that the company may offer. It could be also the case that the audited 
company offered a bribe to the auditor, but this bribe would not compensate the 
auditor’s possible economic or prestige loss, and he would not issue a favorable report 
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when he considers it should be with qualifications, maintaining its morale and being 
independent. 
It is easy to see from the game in normal form (shown in the following figure) that the 
auditor has to be independent as a dominant strategy and the unique equilibrium of the 
game would be the scenario in which the auditor decides to be independent and the 
user trusts the report, which brings the payoffs (m, 1). This is because, since the 
auditor is going to choose to be independent for sure, the best response of the user is 
to trust, since 
1
1
2
  . 
A         U T NT 
I ,1m  
1
,
2
m   
NI ,0f  
1
,
2
f r  
 
Figure 8. Auditor-user game (Normal form) 
 
The second case would be when the auditor prefers not to be independent and issue a 
favorable report in every possible scenario, this is m<f-r (and therefore m<f). Examples 
that we could find in this situation are an unethical auditor, the existence of a high 
variable f and the existence of a very small variable r. 
The case where m is small would be the case of a relatively unethical auditor who 
would not need neither an excessively high compensation for not being independent 
nor a very small cost of not being independent to prefer to follow the company’s 
instructions. However, we consider this is not a very common case in reality. We think 
that it is more common that, given an auditor with an acceptable ethical level (although 
smaller than the extreme case considered before), the difference f-r is sufficiently high. 
On the one hand, a relatively high f can appear because the audited company gives 
great benefits to the auditor for following its instructions. It would be the case in which 
the auditing firm is small and has few clients, and the audited company promises to 
hire the other services the audit firm offers. On the other hand, the existence of a very 
small variable r would occur when the auditor or the auditing firm have greater 
credibility, for having enjoyed prestige during many years in the sector. If that is the 
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case, a possible investigation of auditor’s non-independence would imply a small cost 
in terms of reputation for him. 
It is easy to see that in this case not to be independent is the auditor’s dominant 
strategy and the equilibrium would be the scenario in which the auditor decides not to 
be independent and the user does not trust the report, which brings the payoffs 
1
( , )
2
f r . This is because, since the auditor is going to choose not to be independent 
for sure, the best response of the user is not to trust, since
1
0
2
 . 
The last and most interesting case is the intermediate one. This is the case where if the 
auditor knew that the user is going to trust his report (and therefore does not deal with 
any cost in terms of money and reputation derived from a possible complaint by the 
user), he would prefer not to be independent. That is, if the user relies on his report, the 
satisfaction that the auditor gives to yield to the suggestions of the company and 
present a favorable report when it does not completely reflect the reality, it is greater 
than his moral satisfaction of performing his work objectively (f>m). Thus the auditor 
will benefit from being non-independent as long as the user trusts and does not 
suspect malpractice. 
On the other hand, if the auditor knew that the user is not going to trust his report and 
faces certain monetary and reputation costs derived from a possible user claim (r), the 
auditor would prefer to conduct his work independently and avoid the costs derived 
from the possible investigation revealing its non-independence (m>f-r). 
It is easy to check from the normal representation of the game that there is no scenario 
in which both players choose one of their strategies purely (i.e. with probability 1) and 
none of them have incentives to deviate. The unique equilibrium of the game in this 
case would be in mixed strategies. 
Let x be the probability the auditor assigns to be independent (0<x<1), 1-x is the 
probability that the auditor is not independent; y is the probability with which the user 
will trust (0<y<1), 1-y the probability with which the user will not trust. 
Given the payoffs that are presented by auditor and user, we can capture the following 
expected utilities given the strategies of both. In the case of the user: 
( ) 0UEu T x x     
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1 1 1
( ) (1 )
2 2 2
UEu NT x x x       
To calculate the equilibrium of the expected utilities it will be necessary to equalize both 
equations and to clear the x: ( ) ( )UEu T UEu NT  
1 1 1
    2     
2 2 4
x x x x     
 
3
1  
4
x 
 
It can be seen that the probability with which the auditor will be non-independent: 
3
4
, is 
greater than the probability that it will be independent: 
1
4
. Note that the user’s net 
payoff of not making a mistake if the auditor chooses to be independent, namely, 
trusting the audit report (
1 3
1
2 2
 
   
 
) is much higher than her net payoff of not 
making a mistake if the auditor chooses not to be independent, namely, not trusting the 
report (
1 1
0
2 2
  ). Therefore, the user will be indifferent between trusting and not 
trusting the report (and the indifference principle is satisfied) only if the probability the 
auditor assigns to be independent is smaller than the probability he assigns to not to be 
independent. 
In the auditor's case: 
       1  UEa I ym y m m   
 
        1                  UEa NI yf y f r yf f r yf yr f r yr           
  
To calculate the equilibrium of the expected utilities it will be necessary to equalize both 
equations and to clear the y: ( ) ( )UEa I UEa NI  
 
( )
        
m f r
f r yr m y
r
 
    
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1
f m
y
r

 
 
Taking into account that if the auditor knew that the user is going to trust, he would 
prefer not to be independent: f>m. On the other hand, since if the auditor knew that the 
user will not trust, the auditor would prefer to perform his work independently: m>f-r. 
Joining both equations: f>m>f-r, which ensures that the probability the User assigns to 
Trust, y, is in between 0 and 1.It can be shown in the following way, that y is greater 
than 0 means that 
( )
0
m f r
r
 
 , clearing we find that m>f-r. While y is less than 1 it 
means that
( )
1
m f r
r
 
 , clearing we find that f>m. 
Since f-r will be less than m, as the auditor gives more value to his moral satisfaction 
(m) by respecting the objectivity of the audit reports, it will increase m and, with it, 
increase y as the probability that the user trusts. 
On the contrary, as f increases, the probability of y will decrease. This is because the 
greater the benefit that contributes to the auditor not being independent, the lower the 
probability that the user will trust the opinion of the report. 
We can show the relation of r with respect to y, with its derivative: 
2
' 0
f m
y
r

  . It 
makes sense to think that when the cost to the auditor of not having been independent 
when the user does not trust his report increase, the auditor will prefer to be 
independent, so y will increase, that is, the probability that the user increases, will 
increase as the user has incentives to be independent. 
 
AUDITOR – USER MODEL WITH SIGNALS 
Taking into account that the user relies on the auditor's surroundings to form an opinion 
on his, we can say that the user receives an external signal regarding the auditor's 
level of independence. At the theoretical level it would only make sense to introduce 
these signals about the apparent independence of the auditor in the third case 
analyzed in the previous section. In the first two cases the signals do not make sense 
given that in equilibrium both players know the strategy that the other has chosen. 
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However, in the third case each player only knows that the other has decided to 
choose one of his strategies with certain probability, but not the strategy he has chosen 
finally. Therefore, the third case analyzed in the previous section is a starting point to 
analyze the effect of the signals on the auditor's independence on the behavior of both, 
the auditor and the user. 
To include this aspect in the model, we consider that the user can receive from the 
surroundings one of the following signals, i or ni. The signal i indicates that the auditor 
has kept his independence, and the signal ni indicates the opposite. The signal that 
finally receives is correct with probability equal to 
1
( ,1)
2
  and is incorrect with 
probability equal to 1  . This is summarized in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
It is assumed that this probability   is exogenously given and commonly known by 
both the user and the auditor.  
In this extension of the basic model, when the auditor decides whether or not to keep 
his independence when auditing the firm, the user observes a signal about auditor’s 
independence which she knows is correct with certain probability. The user does not 
observe the actual decision of the auditor but when she checks the audit report the 
signal received helps her to better decide whether or not to trust it 
Note that if 
1
2
  , the signal received by the user does not provide information about 
the decision made by the auditor and the game would be the one analyzed in the 
previous section. 
ni  
i  
i
 
ni  
Prob (i/I)= α 
 
 
Prob (ni/I)= 1-α 
 Prob (i/NI)= 1-α 
 
Prob (ni/NI)= α 
 
 
A 
I 
NI 
 i 
 i 
 i 
Figure 9. Model i and ni signals 
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If 1  , it would be considered that the received signal is 100% correct and the user 
could be sure of the decision made by the auditor when observing the signal. Namely, 
the game would be of perfect information, as the following figure shows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is easy to find the unique equilibrium of this game of perfect information. Note that, in 
the case of receiving the signal i (namely, in case of knowing that the auditor has 
chosen to be independent), the user would choose to trust 
1
(1 )
2
  . If she received 
the signal ni (namely, in case of knowing that the auditor has chosen not to be 
independent) the user would choose not to trust 
1
( 0)
2
 . The auditor, anticipating this 
behavior of the user (since he knows she is receiving a signal about his decision which 
is perfectly correct), will decide to be independent because m>f-r. 
However, the most interesting and realistic case would be that in which the received 
signal is informative 
1
( )
2
   but not perfect ( 1)  . In this section we will study the 
equilibrium of the game proposed in the previous section, in this case. 
Note that now the user has four pure strategies. A pure strategy of the user is a pair 
(x,y) where both x and y are in {T,NT}, x is the action of the user if she observes the 
signal i and y is her action if she observes the signal ni. For instance, the strategy 
(T,NT) means that the user chooses to trust (T) when observing the signal i and 
chooses not to trust (NT) when she receives the signal ni. 
(m,1)            (m,- -
1
2
)   (f,0)             (f-r,- 
1
2
)               
A 
U U 
I 
L 
NI 
L 
T 
L 
T 
L 
NT 
L 
NT 
Figure 10. Auditor-user game (Extensive form-perfect information) 
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Therefore, if the auditor chose to keep his independence, the user would receive the 
correct signal (i in this case) with probability   and the wrong signal (ni) with 
probability 1  . This means that the user would choose her action x with probability 
  and her action y with probability 1  . Similarly, if the auditor decided not to be 
independent, the correct signal, ni in this case, would be received with probability   
and the wrong signal i with probability 1  . That is, the user would choose her action 
x with probability 1   and her action y with probability  . This is what is taken into 
account to obtain the payoffs in the following figure which describes this signaling 
game between the auditor and the user in strategic form. 
 
Figure 11. Auditor-user game with signals (Normal form) 
 
Let us analyze the strategies (T,NT) and (NT,T) because it seems that the strategy 
(T,NT) dominates the (NT,T), so let's proceed to check it: 
3 1 3
       1
2 2 2
      
1 1 1
  
2 2 2
    
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1
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  1
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1
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NI f, 0 
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(1-α) 1/2  + α 0=  
1 1
 
2 2
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We can see that both coincide in the result, the user’s payoff of choosing (T,NT) is 
always higher (no matter what strategy the auditor chooses) than her payoff of 
choosing (NT,T). This is, the strategy (T,NT) of the user dominates the strategy (NT,T). 
Therefore, since the user will never choose the strategy (NT,T), we can eliminate it 
from the game. Note that the fact that the strategy (NT,T) is dominated is quite intuitive. 
What this strategy is saying is that the user chooses not to trust (NT) the audit report 
when she receives the independence signal (i) and to trust it (T) when observing the 
non-independence signal (ni), which makes no sense.   
 
Figure 12. Auditor-user game with signals (Normal form 2) 
 
It is easy to check that the best responses of the user are the same as in the game 
without signals analyzed in the previous section. More precisely, her best response if 
the auditor chose to be independent (I) is (T,T), namely to trust no matter the signal 
received, because 
1 1
1
2 2
      since 
1
2
  . And her best response if the auditor 
chose not to be independent (NI) in (NT,NT), this is not to trust no matter the signal 
observed, because 
1 1
0
2 2
  . 
In the case of the auditor, it is obvious that his best strategies if he knew the user is 
going to choose the same action no matter the signal observed, would be the same as 
in the game without signals. In particular, if he knew the user is going to choose (T,T), 
to trust the audit report no matter the signal observed, his best strategy would be to 
betray his independence (NI), since f>m. If he knew the user is going to choose 
(NT,NT), his best strategy would be to keep his independence (I), since m>f-r. 
 
          i,ni i,ni i,ni 
     U 
A 
(T,T) (T,NT) (NT,NT) 
I m, 1 m, 
3 1
2 2
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Nevertheless, note that the auditor’s best strategy whether he knew the user is going to 
choose (T,NT), this is the user is going to follow the signal observed (trusting the report 
if she observes the independence signal, i, and not trusting it when observing the non-
independence signal, ni) depends on  . If we compare the payoffs of  the (T,NT) 
strategy from the auditor's point of view:  
   
f m
m f r
r
  

    
 
f m
r



 
Therefore, when   is relatively low (more precisely, when   ), the auditor’s best 
strategy if he knew the user is going to choose (T,NT) would be not to be independent 
(NI) since m f r   in this case. However, when   is relatively high (  ), the 
auditor’s best strategy would be to be independent (I) since m f r  . The auditor 
will be indifferent between I and NI (m f r  ) for intermediate values of   (  ). 
Since 
1
( ,1)
2
  , an important question would be, when is 
1
2
  ? 
1 1
2 2
f m
r


    
1
   
2
m f r   
Hence, when 
1
   
2
 m f r ,    and the auditor’s best strategy if he knew the user 
is going to choose (T,NT) would be to be independent (I)  for all  
1
( ,1)
2
  .  
This analysis of the auditor’s best strategy if he knew the user is going to follow the 
signal received shows that there are different cases to take into account when finding 
the equilibrium of the signaling game. Recall that we are considering the case in which 
the reward the company offers to the auditor for following its instructions does not 
compensate enough his economic or prestige loss of taking the risk of not being 
independent and being discovered (m f r  ). Namely, if the auditor knew that the 
user is not going to trust the report, he prefers to be independent. What the previous 
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analysis shows is that it is important to consider in the signaling game the case where 
the company’s reward is slightly high and/or the cost of being discovered is slightly low 
such that, although f r m  , 
1
2
f r m  . 
What the previous analysis shows is that when 
1
2
f r m   in the signaling game, 
although the company’s reward does not compensate the cost of being discovered 
( )f r m   , it is sufficiently high (or the cost sufficiently low) such that if the signal the 
user will receive about his independence is correct with a relatively low probability 
( )  , the auditor (who knows this probability) will prefer not to be independent if he 
knew the user is going to follow the signal. Although the auditor knows that, taking this 
decision, if the user receives the most likely signal ni she is not going to trust the report 
and there is a risk that his non independent behavior is discovered, he is willing to take 
this risk given that the cost of being discovered is not extremely high (and/or the 
company’s reward is not very low) and the scenario where the user receives the wrong 
signal i is not completely unlikely. 
This would represent a situation in which external users do not consider the apparent 
independence is very reliable (because, for instance, the level of competition in the 
market the auditor’s firm is operating is quite high to compromise auditor’s 
independence) but, at the same time they consider that the risk of non independence is 
not extremely high (because, for example, the legal framework is seen as adequate to 
protect auditor’s independence). 
If, in this case however, the signal about the auditor’s independence the user will 
receive is correct with sufficiently high probability (  ), the auditor is not willing to 
take the risk of not being independent when it could be discovered, even though the 
cost of being discovered is not extremely high. This would represent a situation where 
external users consider auditor’s apparent independence quite reliable and the risk of 
non independence is low, for example, when the level of competition the audit firm is 
facing is low enough and the legal framework is good enough such that the auditor’s 
independence is not compromised, and the audit firm is not providing additional 
services to the audited company). 
The last case to take into account is the one where the company’s reward is so low 
and/or the auditor’s cost of being discovered having chosen to issue a report following 
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the company’s instructions is so high (
1
2
f r m  ) that the auditor prefers to be 
independent if he knew the user is going to follow the signal received regardless of the 
probability the signal is correct. If in this case   is small (relatively close to 
1
2
), this 
case would represent a situation where the auditor’s apparent independence is 
somehow reliable because, for instance, the level of competition the audit firm is facing 
is low enough and it is not providing additional services to the audited company but, at 
the same time, not extremely reliable since, for example, the legal framework is not 
considered sufficiently adequate to protect auditor’s independence. In this context, a 
higher   (relatively close to 1) would represent an increase in the reliability of auditor’s 
apparent independence due to an improvement in the legal framework. 
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CONCLUSION 
Throughout this document, we have discussed the relationships that can be 
established between an auditor and a possible user of the accounting information of a 
company and the reports issued by the auditor.  
When we refer to the user, we refer to a person who has some interest in the company 
audited by this professional of the audit, for that reason the relations that can be 
established are so important. That is, we are referring of a user who may be interested 
in buying shares in a company or a bank that has to decide to lend money to the 
company. To form an opinion on this company, you can take a look to the financial 
reports, including the audit reports. Here resides the great importance of the auditor, 
thanks to the confidence that the user places in the auditor will trust or not trust their 
reports. 
We have positioned the auditor with two strategies, be independent or not be 
independent. By defining the auditor as an objective person regarding their work, by 
default the case of a single position would have to be independent, but reality has 
shown us that this is not the case. In order for the proposed models to make sense, the 
user does not have to be able to deduce anything from the report, if reference was 
made to an unfavorable report, the user could deduce that the auditor has been 
independent, it would not make sense to issue a favorable report when you are not 
independent. If the user observes a favorable report with qualifications, he can not 
deduce that the auditor has been independent, since he could have been non-
independent and have issued that report instead of an unfavorable one.  
In that case, we try to conclude that the report being issued will be favorable with 
qualifications, and since it is not independent, the report it will issue will be favorable. In 
this way, we treat an audited company with certain non-serious deficiencies. The user 
will only adopt two basic positions, trusting or not trusting the audit reports. 
At this point, the signals received by the user through the auditor's surroundings are of 
great importance, since through apparent independence, he will choose one of his two 
strategies. For example, we could deal with a surrounding that favors the morality of 
the auditor and reflects a confidence in him, on the contrary, we could deal with a 
surrounding in which the services that the auditor will perform with the audited 
company are favored, and the user would see it as a lack of confidence. After all, the 
user will decide a strategy based on what he thinks the auditor has decided to choose. 
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Conversely, in the case of the auditor, given the strategy that you think the user has 
chosen, decide to be independent or not independent. 
In summary, these are the relationships that, through the surroundings, can be 
established between the auditor and the user. The approach of the theoretical model 
has been made through a theory of games, which has been raised only with the signs 
and has been solved theoretically. They are deductions from these relationships, is not 
a reliable representation of reality but could be considered, like it shown in many other 
studies, has a high level of correspondence. 
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